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LAW OF EVIDENCE FAMILY RELATIONS
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
FAMILY RELATIONS
By ROBERT M. HUTCHINS* AND DONALD SLESINGERT
E XCEPT In cases of necessity' the wife was incompetent to
testify for or against her husband at common law2 Coke
suggests3 that the reason for the rule lay in the fact that husband
and wife were one, and naturally could not be divided for the
purposes of testimony Although the courts soon got beyond this
doctrine, they insisted on the value of the rule. They argued that
spouses, though perhaps not physically identical, were identical
in interest. When disqualification by interest was removed, the
judges bad to take other ground, and did so in Stapleton v
Crofts.' There they decided that the true basis for the rule was
the necessity of martial harmony and confidence.
But even this philosophy has been unable to sustain the no-
ton that one spouse cannot appear for or against the other. The
disqualification has gradually been reduced to a disqualification in
criminal cases alone.' The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Erle in Stapleton v. Crofts states the arguments that have pre-
vailed against broader disqualification. He points out that the
idea of promoting domestic peace is incapable of consistent appli-
cation in these cases. It is not applied to witnesses not parties
to the action. Mr. W may testify for the plaintiff, Mrs. W
against him. Their stories may lead to endless ructions in the
W household. Erle, J., doubts, too, whether husbands suborn
their wives to perjury He is reasonably sure that the exclusion
of the evidence is a definite loss, whereas the gain, if any, is re-
mote and speculative.
*Dean of the Yale University Law School, New Haven. Conn.
tResearch Assistant, Yale University Law School, New Haven, Conn.
'Anonymous, (1710) 11 Mod. 224; I Wigmore, Evidence 2d ed., sec.
612.
-Mary Gri'ggs' Case, (1660) T. Raym. 1, 1 Wigmore, Evidence,
2d ed., sec 601 sets forth the various reasons that have been advanced
for the rule.3Commentary on Littleton 66; see also 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown279.
4(1852) 18 Adol. & El. N. S. 367
5This incompetency has been abolished in England by (1898) St.
61 and 62 Vict. chap. 36, sec. 1. The American statutes are assembled
by Wignmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 488.6(1852) 18 Adol. & El. N; S. 367, 371.
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Although this line of reasoning has led to the abolition of
the general disqualification of husband and wife, it has not led
to its total elimination. The same objections which obtain to the
old rule hold against the modern one. In addition we are con-
fronted with questions of statutory interpretation which have
been solved in somewhat extraordinary ways. In Story v State,'
a short time before the killing the witness heard the defendant's
wife say, "Yes, he thinks more of deceased's wife than he does
of me and the children." This was held "clearly violative of
the rule forbidding the use of the wife's testimony against her
husband and should not have been admitted." An even more
preposterous result was reached in People v Holtz.8 There Mrs.
VVhisman and Mrs. Holtz were on trial for the murder of Whis-
man and the attempted murder of Holtz. Holtz was called for
Mrs. Whisman. His testimony would have exonerated her coin-
pletely But he was not permitted to give it, because the hus-
band of one codefendant may not testify for the other
Great difficulties have arisen too, in determining the limits
ot the principal exception to the modern rule, that for crimes
against the wife. In these cases, though domestic peace may
have long since vanished, the wife is ujually not permitted to
testify unless the husband is on trial for personal violence to her
Where the husband shot at the wife and killed the child in her
arms and was tried for the murder of the child, the wife could
not take the stand because the crime was not against her 0 Yet
the rather complete absence of matrimonial harmony might sug-
gest another result. The same is true of the incest cases,'0 where
the wife is frequently held incompetent although the home has
been pretty well shattered.
If the husband and wife are now not ordinarily disqualified
in civil cases, one class of litigation does involve the total prohi-
bition of testimony by them to certain facts, and is important as
revealing the attitude of the courts toward the institution of the
family Where the legitimacy of offspring is in question the
declarations of husband or wife may not be admitted to prove
illegitimacy Here appears again the idea of the unity of the
family, and its importance to the courts. The Lord Chancellor
7(Tex. Crim. App. 1927) 296 S. W 516.8(1920) 294 Il. 143, 128 N. E. 341 15 Ill. L. Rev 453" 35 Harv L.
Rev. 673, 691, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 332
919 Harv. L. Rev. 545.
1025 Col. L. Rev. 103- 14 Col. L. Rev. 537
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in Russe1I v. Russell," decided only five years ago, stated that
these declarations are inadmissible under any and all circum-
stances. To hold otherwise would invade the sanctity of the
home. This in spite of Lord Sumner's suggestion, ' 2 that the
sanctity of married intercourse passed into the limbo of lost causes
and impossible loyalties in 1857, with the divorce acts of that
date.
This conception of the home as a unit, with all the members
dwelling in sacrosanct confidence and harmony was never, ap-
parently, extended beyond the husband and wife. A son might
testify against his father, and a brother might cast grave doubts
on his sister's paternity Even in days when some remote finan-
cial interest in the result of the action would disqualify, the
most intimate blood relationship would not." Children might
quarrel, they might attack their parents on the stand, their par-
ents might appear for or against them in the most bitterly con-
tested litigation, the domestic peace remained undisturbed.
In contrast with the legal conception of the family as indi-
cated by the rules described above, let us examine the actual
situation of the family at the present time. Before the industrial
revolution a family ui~t was a function of several forces all
working in the same direction. Individual members of families
were tied by sexual and affectional bonds. If these bonds were
frequently ambivalent, disharmony was prevented by economic
necessity and social pressure. It was important to keep the family
together because it was a producing umt, and economic disaster
might very well follow a breakup.1 4 These sexual and economic
forces found formal expression in the law, but one may seriously
aoubt that the law of evidence had any formative effect on family
life in general. Too few people get into court, and the adjective
law is little known outside of it. Family unity there was, beyond
reasonable doubt. But evidence was merely parallel to it.
The industrial revolution wrought profound changes in
family life. It gradually altered family economy, by emphasiz-
ing the family as a consuming, not a producing unit. Means of
support grew up outside the home, freeing the children and the
".[1924] A. C. 687; 37 Harv. L. Rev. 916; 19 Ill. L Rev. 280- 73
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 71
12[1924] A. C. 687, 746.
"3Brown v. State, (1904) 142 Ala. 287, 38 So. 268.
14The sexual.factor may be assumed to be more or less constant
in family relationships. For an account of the family see Goodsell,
Problems of the Family chap. V VI, VII.
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women from economic family domination. It increased mobility
and destroyed the physical unity of the home. In many cases it
forced disunity on unwilling families by introducing competition
between parents and children, husbands and wives, or by creating
widely separated labor markets that had to be tapped if individ-
uals were to live. That male heads of families were able to find
satisfactory employment in coal mines, for instance, was no guar-
antee that the same locality would also absorb the energies of wife
and children. Economically it was no longer necessary, or even
desirable, for the family to remain a unit, indeed, in the early
days of child labor the dormitory system made such unity impos-
sible.15
As a result of the removal of economic pressure negative
attitudes more easily find expression in family disorganization.
Figures substantiate this hypothesis. Since 1870, while the popu-
lation of the United States has only tripled, divorce has increased
seventeen fold.'; The increase is much more marked in urban
than in rural environments, 17 perhaps because the industrial revo-
lution has been more completely achieved in our city than in our
country communities. As a further indication that the removal
of economic pressure promotes disorganization, we find a corre-
lation between divorce curves and business cycles.' In periods of
prosperity the divorce rate is high, while during depression it
shows a marked decrease. Again we find that gainfully employed
females, a definitely increasing group tend to marry later than
their more dependent sisters."" This may be in part caused by
selection, or later marriage may force women into various forms
of employment. But it seems safe to assume that when these
working women finally marry (as most of them do) their inde-
pendence will make them merge less readily into the old style
family
This indicates a different, not necessarily a worse family sit-
nation. People may be hesitant about the agrarian family but
not about marriage and family life in general. If the divorce
rate has increased since 1870, so has the marriage rate.'" Even
"Supra note 14. An interesting commentary on the effects of this
change, and a comparison of it with contemporary primitive societies
will be found in Mead, Margaret, 128 Nation 253.
'
0 Groves and Ogburn, American Marriage and Family Relation-
ships 346.
17Id., 355.
18ld. 355.
1Id., 278.
201d., 151.
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among the divorced, dissatisfaction with a single spouse does not
induce one to abstain permanently from .marriage. Well ov.er
half of the divorced remarry,21 and in one state from which fig-
ures are available most of those who remarry do so in less than
four years.22 Again, although divorce has shown a.marked in-
crease, the length of marriage before divorce has also increased.
2 3
What we are witnessing, then, seems to be a period of social
flux in which the family is changing correlatively with industrial
change. There is still a strong desire for marital harmony, in
fact the divorce rate may indicate that real harmony has become
the paramount issue, now that economic pressure has been re-
moved. Another possible item of evidence for the stress on
marital harmony may be the slight correlation between low birth-
rate and high marriage rate. 4 At the outset even children seem
to be sacrificed to the spousal relationship.
If economic life is disorganizing to the family, so are many
other modem developments. The breakdown of religion, the
diversified recreation made possible by the automobile and the
movie, have destroyed the religious and recreational unity of
the family, and laid emphasis on dispersion.2 5 It is literally true
in many modem families that the right hand knows not what the
left hand doeth. All the social and economic forces of society
then are acting centrifugally, tending to break up the old family
relationship. The only remaining binding ties are sexual and
affectional. This realignment of forces makes a new family ad-
justment inevitable.
In the face of all this we find the law of evidence making a
rather ineffectual effort in a restricted field to stem the tide. No
wonder the disqualifying rule has been swept away in civil cases.
In this period of readjustment, we can see no reason for sacrific-
ing individual justice (as it has demonstrably been sacrificed in
several cases) to a mythical family unity
It may be argued that even though the disqualification s
2
-Groves and Ogburn, American Marriage and Family Relation-
ships 365.
22d., 365.
23Id., 353.
241d., 272. The correlation is not high enough to indicate more
than a slight tendency.25Lynd, R. & H., Middletown, (1928). One of the important
things brought to light by this study was the devotion to automobiles,
radios, etc., even at the expense of food and modern plumbing.
Whether the radio will unify where other recreational devices disor-
ganize is a problem upon which the next few years may throw sonic light.
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removed the rule protecting confidential communications should
be retained, that with everything breaking up the home, and only
affection and intimacy holding it together, these qualities should
be fostered as much as possible. At the present time the chief pro-
tection of the homes of those who succeed in keeping out of the
criminal courts is this privilege. The theory of the privilege is
clear it is intended to promote confidence between husband and
wife by assuring them that their confidences will never be revealed
without their consent. Hence death, divorce, and annulment do
not remove the bar .2 6 Although in the particular case the home
has gone to pieces, other people whose homes are still intact must
be assured that their confidences will remain secret should their
homes ever go to pieces, too.
The problem of administering these statutes has been one of
great- difficulty and has produced much complexity What is a
confidential communication? Apparently profane language ad-
dressed to the wife and ill-treatment of her are not, even though
one would not ordinarily swear at or beat one's wife in public.2
Letters passing between the parties when living in a state of hos-
tility are not confidential, though the writer would not care to
have them printed in the papers.2' Although the courts find ways
of holding that criminal acts of the husband in the wife's pres-
ence are not confidential,'2 the rule as to other acts is not so clear
In the same year the courts of two states took exactly opposite
views of almost the same facts. In State v Dtxson,30 the wife,
whose marriage had been annulled, testified against her husband,
on trial for burglary, and told of gifts of stolen property to her
during marriage. The court held that this was proper, since the
statute forbade communications only, and gifts are not comnmu-
nications. On the other hand, when, in Michigan, 1 a divorced
wife testified to the presence of stolen property in the house dur-
ing coverture, the admission of the testimony was reversible error
under a statute forbidding the husband or wife to be a witness
against the other and during or after marriage to be a witness
26Dexter v. Booth, 2 (1861) Allen (Mass.) 559" 7 Col. L. Rev 137
-7Stillman v. Stillman, (1921) 115 Misc. Rep. 106, 187 N. Y S.
383; Cf. Sherry v. Moore, (Mass. 1928) 163 N. E. 906 where the hus-
band's statement to the wife that he wished she were dead was held
privileged.25Symmgton v. Symington, (1926) 215 App. Div. 553, 214 N. Y
S. 307
29(1926) 26 Col. L. Rev. 897 (1902) 15 Harv. L. Rev. 674.
30State v. Dixson, (1927) 80 Mont. 181, 260 Pac. 138.
;'People v. Geisinger, (1927) 238 Mich. 625, 214 N. W 184.
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to any confidential communication during marriage. Bewilder-
ing distinctions appear in the interpretation of these statutes in
the same court, and even in the same case. Thus in Howard v.
State ' the fact that the wife saw blood on her husband's shirt
is admissible, testimony that she burned the shirt is inadmissible.
On one point the courts seem to be agreed, the presence of
third parties means that the communication is not confidential."
The presence of a third party not visible to husband or wife will
prevent either of them from testifying against the objection of the
other, but will not prevent the eavesdropper from appearing. 'Y
The privilege operates only to protect the spouses against each
other. But here again the problem of interpretation is difficult.
In McKie v. State35 the prosecution offered letters from wife to
husband which had been obtained from third parties. The Su-
preme Court of Georgia held the evidence inadmissible regardless
of the channel through which it reached the court. In this case
the wife was on trial for murdering her husband.
The question of waiver presents the same difficulties in ad-
ministration. It would be supposed that with a privilege wluch
has called forth so much adverse criticism, the courts would be
astute enough to work out a waiver wherever it could be done. In
actions for divorce, it would seem that the party complaining, at
least, might be held to waive the privilege.3 Actions for aliena-
tion of affections, and similar suits, would seem to involve neces-
sarily such an investigation of the relations between the spouses
that the privilege would have to give away. Yet in Nebraska a
statute was required to bring this about, and in Larsen v. Larsen;37
the court limited its decision to a situation where the wife had
already sworn to conversations with her husband, and he was
attempting to reply 38
As in the rules affecting competency we find much confusion
both in interpretation and administration. Sometimes we reach
a logical absurdity in trying to justify the admission of evidence.
If evidentiary rulings had social effects one would never write
letters, and would live in perpetual fear of some intruder hiding
32(Tex. Crim. App. 1926) 280 S. W 586.33See Appeal of Robb, (1881) 98 Pa. 501.
G4Commomwealth v. Griffin, (1872) 110 Mass. 181 Ray v. State, (Ga.
1928) 143 S. E. 603.
-35(Ga. 1927) 140 S. E. 625, noted in 37 Yale L. 3. 669.36But see Lewis v. Lewis. (1928) 224 Ky. 18, 4 S. NV (2d) 1106.
37r(1927) 115 Neb. 601, 213 N. W 971.
3
"See also Kiesgen v. Harness, (1928) 242 Mich. 422. 218 N. W
667 Gjesdahl v. Harmon, (1928) 175 Minn. 414, 221 N. NV 639.
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under the bed or in the closet. As was pointed out previously,
very few people ever get into court,D and practically no one out-
side the legal profession knows anything about the rules regard-
ing privileged communications between spouses. As far as the
writers are aware (though research might lead to another con-
clusion) marital harmony among lawyers who know about privi-
leged communications is not vastly superior to that of other pro-
fessional groups.
Against this emphasis on secrecy we can point to a growing
tendency toward revelation of intimacies where the end in view
seems to justify it. People in personal difficulties are tending
more and more to disclose secrets of their personal lives to
psychiatrists.40  Where scientific truth is desired innumerable
people, many with no personal problems, are not unwilling to
betray marital confidences. A number of recent studies substan-
tiate this view,41 and the subjects of them have not become
demonstrably unhappy as a result. Individual justice is as im-
portant as social science or personal difficulties and has clearly as
much to gain by compulsory waiver of privilege where, in the
discretion of the trial judge, important evidence might be ob-
tained in that way, and no other. Spouses have a perfect right
to protection from publicity (all social science studies guarantee
that absolutely) , but this protection can be obtained in other ways
than that of silence.
It seems clear, then, that family relationships should not dis-
qualify witnesses, nor render important evidence inadmissible
through privilege. If the evidence is admitted, then, should
not the relationship be offered in order to aid the tribunal in
evaluating it? Should not one be able to impeach a witness bv
pointing to relationship and deducing therefrom bias which would
discredit the testimony offered?
Unlike the rules on competency and privilege, the rules on im-
peachment by showing bias extend to other relationships than
a9 Research in Connecticut, New York and Massachusetts reveals
that almost two-thirds of the cases put on the court calendar are with-
drawn or discontinued before reaching judgment. (Unpublished tables
from the files of the Yale study of court administration, tinder the
chairmanship ot Prof. Charles E. Clark.)
"
0This is evidenced by the growth of psychiatric practice in cities
like New York. Boston and Chicago, and by the enormous amount of
popular literature on the subject that has appeared in the last decade.41Katherme B. Davis' study (by mailed questionnaire) of 1.000
married and 1,000 single women; J. 0. Chassell's, Personality Variables
and G. V Hamilton's. A Research in Marriage, to name only a few.
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that of husband and wife. A communication between parent and
child or sister and brother is never privileged because of relation-
ship. But any relationship may be used to show the possibility
that the witness is lying because of it. The rule extends to illicit
love affairs,42 which are protected by no privilege,43 and to all
family situations. It is supposed that the jury should have an
opportumty to appraise the testimony in the light of the witnesses'
relations to the parties by blood, marriage, affection, or interest.
There is no doubt that living together, frequent visiting or
intimate relationships produce emotional reactions in all parties
concerned. The courts assume that bias is always in the same
direction. In the light of recent research that does not seem to
be the case. Myth and literature contain many suggestions of
ambivalent attitudes toward those whom one is supposed to love.
Generations of Greek gods thrived on patricide. Oedipus mur-
dered his father for love of his mother, Hamlet's attitude toward
his mother and uncle-father could never come to rest because of
the battle of antagonistic emotions going on within lim. In "The
Brothers Karamazov," Ivan, on trial for his life, cries, "They all
desire the death of their fathers." The testimony of these char-
acters would scarcely have been predictably biased in favor of
their relatives.
Recent psychological investigation has shown that these are
not literary exceptions, but may prove to be the general rule.
It is insisted by psycho-analysts that the great interest in the
Oedipus myth, for example, results from the fact that it objectifies
an experience common to mankind. Because of that Freud des-
ignated the situation where a child prefers the parent of the op-
posite sex and is jealous of (hostile to) the parent of his own,
the Oedipus complex where the child is a boy, and the Electra
where it is a girl.44 Although investigators differ somewhat as
to the age at which this incest wish undergoes repression, 3 the
preference and rivalry are admitted as matters of common obser-
vation. This infantile attitude, unless properly handled, frequently
continues into adult life, sometimes resulting in a psychoneurosis.
Where it does not become definitely pathological, there is still a
strong native antagonism, overlaid by the mores. which keep it in
4-State v. Abbott, (1902) 65 Kan. 139, 69 Pac. 160, (1902).
43 Rex v. Bramley, (1795) 6 Durn. & East 330.
44Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis 175; Fliigel.
Psychoanalytical Study of the Family 12.
45 G. V Hamilton, for example, in Research in Marriage 546.
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place most of the time. Obviously a situation of this sort, while
productive of bias, without doubt, does not prduce predictable
bias. In order to estimate a statement made on the stand we
must abandon a general rule, and turn to the psychology of the
individual in question.
The Oedipus complex has a corollary in the attitude of par-
ents toward children of the same sex. It is a matter of more or
less common knowledge that family favoritism runs to sexual
opposites. How this situation will affect any given testimony can
not be foreseen without a wide margin of error And general
ignorance of these emotions is such that it is not safe merely to
present the relationship to the jury, and trust to its evaluating
ability
The reason it is unsafe to trust to the introspection of twelve
men in deciding whether bias is likely to be for or against is
that the attitudes described are frequently unconscious. The
father, child, husband or wife is usually only conscious of his
socially acceptable attitudes. We have seen4" that people declare
that they are emotionally aroused by words which are supposed
to arouse emotion although objective tests indicate that their self
observation is false. As an example take the over solicitous
husband, shielding his wife from drafts, bothering her a dozen
times a day trying to make her comfortable, whose later behavior
showed that he was concealing his true feelings, even from him-
self, 47 or the woman recently married who, while still professing
great love for her husband, failed to recognize him across the
street,4" and whose divorce revealed the trend of her emotion.
These unconscious factors can only be brought to light by a special
technique.
If parents and children are just as likely to be prejudiced
against as for each other, can we expect something different in
the husband-wife or fraternal relationships' There is abundant
clinical evidence that the same situation obtains in the latter that
we find in the former Fraternal antagonism may be due to a
number of factors. Fliigel in his Psycho-analytic Study of the
Family49 states that a most common one is the jealousy of chil-
dren for new born infants who necessarily take up a great deal of
4 6Syz, Observations on the Unrealiability of Subjective Reports of
Emotional Reactions, 17 Brit. Jour. Psych. Gen. Sect. 119-126.47Freud, Psychopathology of Everyday Life.
48Freud, Psychopathology of Everyday Life.49Fliigel, Psychoanalytical Study of the Family 19.5
°Freud, S., General Introduction to Psychoanalysis 280, 172.
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parental time and attention that formerly went to the older
child.5" The infant's day is over when he comes into direct com-
petition with his older sib and finds himself inadequate in many
fields. Rivalry and competition last into adult life for a variety
of reasons, one child may be more attractive or able than another,
parents may favor one against the other; there may be fear of
the ultimate disposal of the parental estate. Legal observers can
point to enough instances which cast doubt upon the positive feel-
ing sibs are supposed to have for one another, to make further
elaboration superfluous.
Spousal antagonism may be observed through increasing di-
vorce5 or such studies of marital behavior as that recently under-
taken by G. V Hamilton. He found as possible sources of an-
tagonism, sexual relationships, economic affairs, and previous
attitudes of spouses toward their parents, to name but a few 5-
Only forty-four of two hundred men and women studied answered
unqualifiedly "Nothing" to the question "What things in your
married life annoy and dissatisfy you most."53 One hundred and
fifty-four in describing the traits of their spouses referred to un-
desirable ones. 54 One hundred and seventeen of them began to
be seriously dissatisfied with some lack or shortcoming in their
spouses at some stage in their married lives.5" This group may
not have been representative, but clearly many members of it
would scarcely be expected to rush unequivocally to the defense
of their spouses. Here, as previously, though bias may oe as-
sumed, its amount or direction will only be revealed as a resu!t
of careful individual study How detailed this study will be,
depends, of course, on how crucial is the testinonv offered by
the supposedly biased person. Again the reader should be re-
minded that these spousal attitudes are, for the most part, uncon-
scious. They are infrequently expressed in overt behavior, and
might conceivably result not in deliberate lying on the stand, but
an unconscious distortion of testimony that might unduly prejudice
a jury
We find, on the whole, then, that there is a decided lag in
the judicial attitude towards the family, at least as far as the
-
51 n Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration. Conn. Bar
Jour. (July 1928) p. 8 we find that over one-fourth of the cases heard
in the trial courts are family disorganization cases.
5 2G. V Hamilton, Research in Marriage.
53M., p. 7
541d., p. 70.
55M., p. 68.
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rules of evidence are concerned. The courts are trying to main-
tain a family organization that is being superseded by a new
one. There seems to be no special reason for maintaining a mori-
bund family concept, for the modern one is demonstrably better
suited to our economic structure, and according to any observers,
is better for the independent development of children. Further-
more, even if it were desirable to emphasize the mediaeval family,
it seems that the law of evidence is a peculiarly ineffectual branch
ot jurisprudence to foster it, because it is the most technical, and
least known field as far as the general public is concerned. Thus
the courts, in some cases at least, are sacrificing justice to a ques-
tionable and, by this means, unenforceable ideal. Therefore it
would not be unsafe to extend the attitude in civil cases to cover
the whole family field. Disqualification thus would be removed.
Privilege might well be restricted, with the understanding that
it is automatically waived wherever crucial evidence can be ob-
tained in no other way When family bias is shown in order to
impeach a witness, it should be rebuttable by detailed individual
histories, whenever the evidence offered is important enough to
have great weight with the tribunal.
